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Abstract
Background: The public is less willing to allow their personal health information to be disclosed for research
purposes if they do not trust researchers and how researchers manage their data. However, the public is more
comfortable with their data being used for research if the risk of re-identification is low. There are few studies on
the risk of re-identification of Canadians from their basic demographics, and no studies on their risk from their
longitudinal data. Our objective was to estimate the risk of re-identification from the basic cross-sectional and
longitudinal demographics of Canadians.
Methods: Uniqueness is a common measure of re-identification risk. Demographic data on a 25% random sample
of the population of Montreal were analyzed to estimate population uniqueness on postal code, date of birth, and
gender as well as their generalizations, for periods ranging from 1 year to 11 years.
Results: Almost 98% of the population was unique on full postal code, date of birth and gender: these three
variables are effectively a unique identifier for Montrealers. Uniqueness increased for longitudinal data. Considerable
generalization was required to reach acceptably low uniqueness levels, especially for longitudinal data. Detailed
guidelines and disclosure policies on how to ensure that the re-identification risk is low are provided.
Conclusions: A large percentage of Montreal residents are unique on basic demographics. For non-longitudinal data
sets, the three character postal code, gender, and month/year of birth represent sufficiently low re-identification risk.
Data custodians need to generalize their demographic information further for longitudinal data sets.
1 Background
There are increasing pressures to make individual-level
data more readily available for research and policy mak-
ing [1-5], and there are believed to be many benefits to
doing so [2,6-19]. Such broad disclosures of health data
also pose significant privacy risks [20]. Moreover, the
public is uncomfortable providing personal information,
or allowing their personal information to be used for
research, if they do not trust the organization collecting
and using the data. Individuals often cite privacy and
confidentiality concerns and lack of trust in researchers
as reasons for not having their health information used
for research [21]. One study found that the greatest pre-
dictor of patients’ willingness to share information with
researchers was the level of trust they placed in the
researchers themselves [22]. A number of US studies
have shown that attitudes toward privacy and confiden-
tiality of the census are predictive of people’s participa-
tion [23,24], and also that there is a positive association
between belief in the confidentiality of census records
and the level of trust one has in the government [25].
These trust effects are amplified when the information
collected is of a sensitive nature [25,26].
One way to retain the trust of the public is to ensure
that the risk of re-identification is low before the disclo-
sure of data to researchers or at the earliest opportunity
after collection [21,27-35]. As many as 86% of respon-
dents in one study were comfortable with the creation
and use of a health database for research purposes
where individuals could not be re-identified, whereas
only 35% were comfortable with such a database that
included identifiable information [33]. Furthermore,
many research ethics boards (REBs) will waive the con-
sent requirement if the first “use” of the data is to de-
identify it [36,37].
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It is generally accepted that individuals can be easily
re-identified through their basic demographics because
these demographics make individuals unique in the
population. The uniqueness of individuals is often used
as a surrogate measure of re-identification risk [38-43].
In the US it has been estimated that between 63% and
87% of the population is unique on their basic demo-
graphics [39,41], and more than 99% of Dutch citizens
are [43]. Demographic information, such as residence
postal code, date of birth, and gender, is included in
many health data sets disclosed for secondary purposes,
such as research.
There has been a dearth of studies on the uniqueness
of Canadians on their basic demographics, and no stu-
dies have been performed on the re-identification risk
from longitudinal data sets in any jurisdiction. Longitu-
dinal data sets will often include an individual’s location
trail over time. For example, in an electronic medical
record (EMR) the residence of the patient is often
updated at every visit; therefore an EMR data set will
have a patient’s residence trail.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the unique-
ness of Montrealers using longitudinal demographic
information over an 11 year period. Based on this analy-
sis we provide guidelines and a list of disclosure policies
that will ensure that the risk of re-identification is
acceptably low.
1.1 Definitions
We define a quasi-identifier as a variable in the data set
that can be used to probabilistically identify an indivi-
dual. General examples of quasi-identifiers include sex,
geographic indicators (such as postal codes, census geo-
graphy, information about proximity to known or
unique landmarks), and event dates (such as birth,
admission, discharge, procedure, death, specimen collec-
tion, visit/encounter).
Uniqueness means that there is only one individual
with those values on the quasi-identifiers in the popula-
tion. For example, if our quasi-identifiers are age, gen-
der, and postal code, and there is only one 90 year old
female in the postal code “H3A 2T5”, then she is a
unique individual on these quasi-identifiers. Other vari-
ables that are not considered quasi-identifiers are not
taken into account in the evaluation of uniqueness.
1.2 Methods of Attack
In this section we illustrate why population uniqueness
makes it easy to re-identify individuals in a disclosed
data set. We assume that the data is being disclosed for
research purposes.
Consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 1. We have
a population registry, for example, the census, which
holds the names and some basic demographics of all
individuals. Any particular data set that is disclosed for
research purposes will be a subset of that population
registry. The figure shows two disclosed data sets, (a)
and (b), which contain the basic demographics as well
as sensitive test results.
If an adversary has background information about
Alan Smith, such as his gender and year of birth, and
knew that Alan’s record was in the disclosed data set
(a), then it would be relatively easy for the adversary to
find Alan’s record. The reason is that Alan Smith is
unique in the population: there is only one male born in
1962 in the population. If an individual is unique in the
population then that individual will also be unique in a
sample. Therefore, when the adversary finds the
<male,1962 > record in data set (a) it will be Alan with
certainty. An adversary would know Alan’s basic demo-
graphics because the adversary may be Alan’s neighbour,
co-worker, spouse or ex-spouse, or maybe Alan is a
famous person and his demographics are publicly
known.
Now consider the disclosed data set (b), which is
another sample from the population. In this example
the adversary has some background demographic infor-
mation about Alice Shields. However, the adversary
does not know if Alice is in the disclosed data set or
not. For example, the data set may be a sample survey
and an adversary would not know who was asked to
participate, and out of those, who responded. However,
Alice is unique in the population: there is only one
female born in 1975 in the population. If the adversary
finds a record in the disclosed data set with a female
born in 1975 then the adversary will know with cer-
tainty it is Alice, and therefore Alice’s record would be
re-identified.
The above examples illustrate that population unique-
ness makes disclosed data vulnerable to re-identification
by an adversary who has basic demographics about tar-
geted individuals. This is true whether the adversary
knows a priori if the target individuals are in the dis-
closed data set or not.
Consider another scenario, that the adversary had
access to a population registry, such as a voter registra-
tion list, which would contain the basic demographics
[44]. The adversary was going to match the disclosed
data set (a) against the voter list for re-identification
purposes. This is different from the above two scenarios
because now the adversary is not trying to re-identify a
specific targeted individual, but rather trying to re-iden-
tify any record that matches. The record in the disclosed
database with a male born in 1962 will match with
record number 2 in the voter registration list. Because
this is Alan’s record and Alan is unique in the popula-
tion, this will be a correct match with certainty. The
more unique individuals in the population, the greater
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the number of correct matches under this method of
attack.
It is important to make a distinction between popula-
tion uniqueness and sample uniqueness. Consider the
record <male, 1959 > in table (b) in Figure 1. This
record is unique in the sample but is not unique in the
population. If an adversary was trying to re-identify the
record for John Smith in table (b) and did not know if
John Smith was in table (b), then it would not be possi-
ble to determine with certainty whether that matching
record in table (b) really belongs to John Smith or not.
Therefore, it is population uniqueness that is relevant as
a measure of re-identification risk, and not sample
uniqueness.
1.3 The Identifiability of Demographics
While Canadian privacy laws apply to identifiable perso-
nal information [45], not many of them provide an
explicit definition of what is meant by “identifiable
information”. For example, in Ontario’s Personal Health
Information Protection Act identifying information is
defined as “information that identifies an individual or
for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circum-
stances that it could be utilized, either alone or with
other information, to identify an individual” and Alber-
ta’s Health Information Act defines individually identify-
ing information where “the identity of the individual
who is the subject of the information can be readily
ascertained from the information”. Statutory tests for
identifiability range from lower thresholds of what is
“reasonably foreseeable” or can be “reasonably expected”
to identify individuals, to higher thresholds of what is
“readily ascertainable” or “obvious”. None of these
thresholds expressly require application from any parti-
cular perspective (for example, a highly sophisticated
expert, or conversely, a lay member of the general pub-
lic) nor do they make express reference to the level of
resources, time or effort necessary to re-identify
Figure 1 Example of data sets matched against a population registry with uniques.
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individuals. Furthermore, they do not define a metric to
measure risk on, nor a quantitative value for what
would be acceptable risk.
In our context, the implication is that basic demo-
graphics, such as date of birth and postal code informa-
tion, may in some cases be considered identifiable
information and in other cases may not be, depending
on which subjective test is applied. In practice, this
results in considerable variability, and calls for more
precise and quantitative approaches to measure iden-
tifiability and developing acceptable risk thresholds in a
Canadian context.
There are some similarities to the US, where the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule defines two standards for de-
identification. The Safe Harbor standard specifies 18
variables that must be removed, including date of birth
and full ZIP codes. While very precise, it could result in
significant information loss [46]. The Statistical standard
requires an expert to certify that the “the risk is very
small that the information could be used, alone or in
combination with other reasonably available informa-
tion, by an anticipated recipient to identify an individual
who is a subject of the information”. This is similar to
the Canadian approach in that it is possible to allow
more detailed information to be disclosed if the risk of
re-identification can shown to be very small. This neces-
sitates the definition of re-identification risk metrics and
what “very small” means.
2 Methods
2.1 Data Set
The provincial health insurance claims database of Que-
bec holds demographic information on all citizens that
have health insurance. Because this is publicly financed
insurance, it effectively captures the whole population.
We sampled records on 928,708 individuals living in
the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area, as defined in
the 2006 Census, from the provincial health insurance
database. A random sample of 2.5% of individuals was
taken each year over an 11 year period between 1996
and 2006 inclusive. Because by chance some individuals
appeared more than once, this data set represents
approximately 25% of the population of Montreal.
For each individual we obtained their date of birth,
gender, date of death if they died during that period, as
well as their full postal code. Individuals had their full
residence postal codes determined at the beginning of
each year by the provincial insurer. We therefore had
postal code information for each sampled individual for
each of the 11 years (with the exception of births and
deaths, as noted below).
The Quebec provincial health insurer updates the
population addresses in its database every week using
three sources: (a) a government services web site where
the public can change their address directly and this
affects their records in multiple departments, such as
elections, social insurance, provincial taxes, and health
insurance, (b) the automobile insurance service (la Soci-
ete de l’assurance automobile du Quebec) where drivers
must renew their license every year and update their
address, and (c) renewals by the public of their health
insurance cards, which must happen every four years.
Despite these processes to ensure correct information,
one percent of the patients had to be removed because
they had no postal codes (i.e., no postal codes at all for
any year), and 5% were removed because they had
inconsistent postal codes (e.g., postal codes before birth
and postal codes after death).
2.2 Births and Deaths
For patients who were born during that 11 year period
or died during that period, specific unborn ("UUU-
UUU”) and dead ("DDD-DDD”) postal codes were used
for the empty years. By doing so, we assume that an
adversary would know that an individual was not born
or is dead and therefore can use that background
knowledge in a re-identification attack. For example,
assume that there were two males born in 1940 who
were now dead. One had a missing postal code and one
with a “DDD-DDD” postal code. If an adversary was try-
ing to re-identify the record of a deceased John Smith
who was born in 1940, then the adversary would know
which record belongs to John Smith. If we did not
account for death then that adversary knowledge would
not help the adversary. If both records had missing
postal codes then knowledge that John Smith was
deceased would not help the adversary determine which
was the correct record. The missing values may be due
to a clerical error or because both individuals died or
some combination of these two explanations. For such
an adversary the uniqueness values will be lower than
the values we present here, meaning that our unique-
ness estimates would be lower for an adversary who
does not have birth/death background information.
By taking the first option, and indicating births and
deaths, we assume a more knowledgeable adversary.
The data set we analyzed consisted of 3,530 unique
postal codes.
2.3 Measuring Risk
We used uniqueness as the measure of re-identification
risk. This is a commonly used metric of re-identification
risk in the disclosure control literature [38-43].
The three quasi-identifiers we used were date of birth,
postal code, and gender. For example, if we consider the
full date of birth, the full postal code, and gender, then
the uniqueness measure gives us the proportion of
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individuals in Montreal who are unique on their values
on these three variables. Since we only have a sample,
population uniqueness was estimated using the Zayatz
estimator [47].
2.4 Analysis
In this analysis, we will refer to a series of postal codes
over time as a ‘residential trail’. For example, the postal
code information for an individual over three years is a
three year residential trail.
Each study point consists of a set of generalizations on
the three variables and the number of years of the resi-
dential trail. A uniqueness value was computed for each
study point.
The date of birth was generalized to month and year
of birth, then year of birth. The full 6-character postal
code was generalized to 5 characters, 4 characters, and
so on until 1 character. The postal code generalization
was performed by cropping the last character. For exam-
ple, a 6 character postal code “H3A 2T5” would be
cropped to a 5 character postal code as “H3A 2T”, and
so on.
The analysis was performed for residential trails of
one year, 2 years, and so on in 1 year increments to 11
years. For the one year residential trails we selected a
year at random out of the 11 with equal probability
and computed uniqueness for that. Initially we
repeated this 1000 times, each time selecting a year at
random, with the average uniqueness computed across
the 1000 runs. For two years and more, we randomly
selected years that were not necessarily contiguous.
We used a change threshold of 0.0001 for average
uniqueness, which would allow us to stop the itera-
tions sooner if the amount of change from one itera-
tion to the next over 10 iterations is smaller than the
threshold. In practice then, the average uniqueness was
computed across 100 to 500 iterations before the stop-
ping criterion was met.
We also examined uniqueness for youth and adults
separately. An individual was considered to be a youth if
s/he was less than 20 years old during the sampled per-
iod. For example, if we are looking at a two year resi-
dence trail, then for either of the sampled 2 years an
individual would have to be less than 20 years to be
considered a youth.
2.5 Ethics
The analysis of this data set was approved by the
Research Ethics Board (REB) of the Children’s Hospital
of Eastern Ontario Research Institute, the McGill Uni-
versity REB, the Quebec provincial health insurance
agency (RAMQ), and the privacy commissioner of
Quebec.
3 Results
Approximately 48% of the population did not change
their residential address at any time during the 11 year
period, 21% changed address once, 17% twice, 8% three
times, and 6% four times or more.
The estimated uniqueness results for 1 year, 2 years, 5
years, and 11 years are shown in Figure 2. Just under
30% of the sample was youth, and the remainder were
adults. The results for adults and youth separately are
not presented in detail here because they are very simi-
lar to the results for the full data set. However, they are
included in their entirety in additional file 1.
Uniqueness tended to be slightly higher for adults
compared to youth. This is not unexpected as there are
many possible values for adult dates of birth compared
to youth, resulting in many more ‘bins’ that a birth date
may fall into, and therefore increasing the chances of
unique values.
The first interesting observation is for a single year
residential trail: the proportion of individuals is close to
zero for the full six character postal code (see Figure 2
panel a). Using only the postal codes, as the length of
the residential trail increases, the proportion of indivi-
duals who are unique grows. Over two years that pro-
portion grows to 17.4% of the population, over 5 years
35% of the population are unique, and approximately
43% are unique on their residential trail over the 11
years. A significant proportion of the population has a
unique residence pattern even over short periods of
time, as small as two years.
When the full date of birth is used together with the
full postal code, then approximately 98% of the popula-
tion are unique with only one year of data (panel b).
When the full date of birth and a multi-year residential
trail are considered, then almost all of the population is
unique. This means that date of birth and full postal
code, together, are a unique identifier for Montrealers. If
we add gender (panel f) then the whole population is
unique. Reducing the granularity of the postal code to 1
character together with the full date of birth does
reduce the proportion of uniques considerably, but even
then it still has a nontrivial magnitude at almost 5%
uniqueness for a five year residential trail.
Using a one year residential trail with postal code and
gender together does not make a high proportion of the
population unique (panel e - almost zero percent
uniqueness), but when 2 years or more of data are used,
the percentage of unique increases beyond 20%.
The differences in uniqueness are most pronounced
when we consider shorter residential trails than for
longer periods. For example, the difference in unique-
ness between a single year and a 2 year residential trail
is larger than the difference between a 10 year and an
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11 year trail. This means that from a re-identification
risk perspective, reducing a longitudinal data set from
11 years to say 10 years may not have much of an
impact, whereas reducing it from 3 years to 2 years the
drop in risk could be significant.
In Canada, it is common practice to disclose health
information with only three characters of the postal
code under the general belief that this results in low re-
identification risk. For a single year data set, the three
character postal code, gender, and month/year of birth
represents quite a low uniqueness value (panel g) and
therefore would be considered to have low re-identifica-
tion risk. If the three character postal code is combined
with the full date of birth (panel b), however, close to
80% of the population is unique. Therefore, whether a
three character postal code represents acceptable re-
identification risk or not will depend on what are the
other quasi-identifiers that are disclosed: it is not
(a): postal code (b): postal codes + DoB
(c): postal codes + mm/yy of birth (d): postal codes + year of birth
(e): postal codes + gender (f): postal codes + gender + DoB
(g): postal codes + gender + mm/yy of birth (h): postal codes + gender + year of birth
Figure 2 Estimated uniqueness results for different levels of generalization on the three demographic variables for 1 year, 2 years, 5
years, and 11 years.
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possible to make a meaningful risk assessment by con-
sidering only the postal code if there are other quasi-
identifiers in the data set.
If one is considering the disclosure of longitudinal
data, what was acceptable for a single year may not be
acceptable any more. For example, a five year residential
trail of the three character postal code, gender, and
month/year of birth make close to 40% of the popula-
tion unique (panel g), which is quite different from the
cross-sectional risk. Consequently, one must determine




We performed an analysis of the uniqueness of Mon-
treal residents on basic demographics. The results indi-
cate that on basic demographics, the population
uniqueness is quite high. The inclusion of residence
postal code information over time (the residence trails)
ensures that a large percentage of the population is
unique, even if we remove gender and generalize the
date of birth. To properly assess the risks one must con-
sider all of the quasi-identifiers and the length of the
residential trail.
4.2 Practical Implications
Our results can be used by data custodians and research
ethics boards to decide if the risk of re-identification is
sufficiently low for the disclosure of health information
for research, and possibly other secondary purposes.
Thus far such decisions have been based more on intui-
tion and less on actual evidence.
While there are no globally accepted standards for
deciding when the value of uniqueness is too high, there
are some precedents that one can consider.
There have been attempts at empirically measuring
the actual re-identification risk of HIPAA Privacy
Rule Safe Harbor data sets. One analysis concluded
that 0.04% of the population is unique for a Safe Har-
bor compliant set of variables [48,49]. Another study
evaluated the proportion of records that can be re-
identified in a Safe Harbor compliant sample and
found that only 0.01% can be correctly re-identified
[50]. Recent work has shown that the proportion of
unique individuals implied by Safe Harbor depends
on the state one is referring to [44]: the re-identifica-
tion risk varies from 0.25% of the population being
unique in Wyoming to less than 0.01% for California
(at least a 25 times difference in re-identification
risk). However, it has been argued that the Safe Har-
bor standard is most useful if one is making data
publicly available, and may be too stringent for
research contexts [46].
Previous disclosures for research purposes, for exam-
ple of cancer registry data, have deemed thresholds of
5% and 20% population uniqueness as acceptable
thresholds to use for research data [51-53]. The higher
threshold would be suitable where the recipient is more
trusted (for example, internal or affiliated researchers)
and the lower one for external researchers with no exist-
ing relationship with the data custodian. With these
guidelines, a custodian can use our results to decide
how much generalization to apply to a data set, and if it
is a longitudinal data set, how many years of data to dis-
close before the risk becomes unacceptably high.
In additional file 2 we provide all of the possible
values on the demographics that would be acceptable
under the 5% and 20% thresholds. These represent dis-
closure policies that can be justified, assuming the two
thresholds. For example, in the cross-sectional case (1
year) a data set with the full date of birth, gender, and
the first character of the postal code would be accepta-
ble under both the 5% and 20% thresholds. However, if
the postal code had 3 characters then this would not be
acceptable. This should provide data custodians and
data users with concrete guidance for data disclosures.
It is also important to note some caveats to the practi-
cal application of our results by highlighting two
assumptions: (a) a disclosed data set is a simple random
sample from the population, and (b) the adversary does
not know who is in the disclosed data set.
When we consider our methods of attack discussed
earlier, the proportion of the population that is unique
is a good reflection of re-identification risk if the dis-
closed data is sampled with equal probability from the
population (of Montreal). This is because the expected
proportion of unique records in a sample will be the
same as the proportion of unique records in the popula-
tion [54]. However, if the disclosed data set departs
markedly from a simple random sample, then the
uniqueness may be quite different. For example, if a
data set consists of only females aged 13 to 17, then the
number of possible equivalence classes on the demo-
graphic quasi-identifiers and over time will be much
smaller than for all youth. This particular subset will
likely have a different proportion of individuals that are
unique compared to the whole population. While the
simplifying assumption of simple random sampling is
often used in the disclosure control literature, one
should be cognizant of its limitations.
We also make the assumption that the adversary does
not know who is in the disclosed data set. If the adver-
sary knows who is in the data set then population para-
meters do not matter in the evaluation of re-
identification risk [55]. For example, the year of birth
and 4 character postal code for youth makes 9.2% of the
population unique. If we have a (sample) data set of
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:46
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/46
Page 7 of 12
1000 records, it could be that, say, 50% of the records in
that data set are unique on the year of birth and the 4
character postal code. If an adversary knew that Alice
was in that disclosed data set then the risk for Alice
would be much higher than 9.2%. A detailed review of
the conditions for deciding whether it is likely that an
adversary would know if an individual is in a disclosed
data set or not was provided in a recent article [55]. For
instance, if a research study is sampling patients at ran-
dom from an insurance claims database then it would
not be possible for an adversary to know who is in that
sample. On the other hand, if teenage participants in a
drug use survey need consent from their parents to
respond, then the parents will know if their children are
in the data set. Therefore, if it is plausible for an adver-
sary to know who is in the disclosed data set then sam-
ple uniqueness is the relevant re-identification risk
metric rather than population uniqueness.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Six percent of the records were removed in our analysis.
We found that 1% of the records did not have a postal
code and were removed. Had we kept these records in
the data set as null records that could have artificially
reduced our uniqueness estimates. Also, 5% had incon-
sistent records - since we did not know the cause of the
inconsistency (the date of birth/death or the postal
code), these records were also removed. The most likely
reason for these inconsistencies is a data entry error.
There is no a priori reason to believe that these data
entry errors were systematic in that they would be more
likely in unique versus non-unique individuals.
If we assume that the 6% of the records that we
removed were a random sample from the full data set,
then there would be no impact on our uniqueness
values. If all of the records that were removed were
unique, our uniqueness values would increase slightly
had they somehow been corrected and retained. If none
of the records that we removed were unique, our
uniqueness values would decrease slightly had they
somehow been corrected and retained.
The changes in the uniqueness value are shown in
Figure 3. This graph shows how the uniqueness esti-
mates for a data set would be inflated/deflated under
the two extreme conditions described above. At low
uniqueness values, there would be the biggest increase if
we assumed that the removed records were all unique
and retained them. At high uniqueness values, there
would be the biggest decrease if we assumed that none
of the removed records were unique and we removed
them.
In terms of impact on the acceptable values on the
three quasi-identifiers in additional file 2, we are mostly
concerned with the case where uniqueness is low.
Where our results show a uniqueness of 5%, the actual
uniqueness may be slightly higher at 10% under the
extreme situation that all the records we removed were
also unique, and at 20% the actual uniqueness may be
as high as 25%. However, in practice it is highly unlikely
that all records with data entry errors are unique.
4.4 Representativeness of the Results
In this section we examine the extent to which the
results can be generalized beyond Montreal and how
they compare to the results in the US.
4.4.1 Generalization to Other Urban Canadian Centers
One important question is whether the results obtained
from Montreal can be generalized to other urban areas
in Canada. There is evidence that uniqueness can be
explained by the geographic area’s population size [40].
For example, if Montreal postal codes were uncharacter-
istically small compared to other cities, then one would
have concerns that our uniqueness estimates would be
exaggerated for other cities. However, a comparison
among the Montreal postal code population sizes and
those of Ottawa and Toronto is shown in Table 1. As
can be seen, Montreal areas tend to be the same size or
larger than the other cities. This suggests that our
results are likely conservative and that uniqueness may
be slightly higher in other urban areas.
4.4.2 Generalization to Rural Areas
Another concern is whether our results can be general-
ized to rural areas in Canada. As shown in Figure 4,
rural postal codes tend to have larger populations than
urban ones (with the exception of New Brunswick, but
in that province all postal codes are classified as urban).
We used the Canada Post and the Canadian Medical
Association definitions of a rural postal code, which is
only one of multiple possible definitions [56], but a
Figure 3 The maximum and minimum uniqueness values had
we retained the records with data entry errors.
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common one. The larger population sizes in rural postal
codes means that uniqueness values will tend to be
smaller than the ones presented here.
Below we provide a more direct analysis demonstrat-
ing that the uniqueness results for urban areas cannot
be generalized to rural areas. This analysis is limited to
the province of Ontario. We assume that these results
would be generally representative to other areas of
Canada.
We follow a method used by Sweeney in her estimate
of population uniques in the US [39]. In her study she
only had ZIP codes and the number of people within
each age group living in that ZIP code, and her objective
was to compute uniqueness. She computed the popula-
tion uniqueness on simple demographics by randomly
distributing the population living within a geographic
area to the different “day of birth” bins. For instance,
within a year there are 365 days and there may be 400
people living in that area who are 35 years old. She then
distributed the 400 35-year-olds uniformly across all
days of their birth year to obtain an actual date of birth.
First we need to ascertain whether uniqueness on the
basic demographics is stable if we uniformly distribute
individual birthdays across the year as we described
above. We took the birth registry for Ontario for the
five years from 2004 to 2008, and randomly assigned
each newborn a new day of birth within their actual
year of birth using a uniform distribution. For example,
an Ontarian born on 1st January 2005 may be reassigned
to 12th March 2005. We then computed uniqueness on
the new day of birth and actual postal code, and com-
pared that to uniqueness using the original day of birth.
The results are shown in Table 2. This indicates that
the uniqueness on actual date of birth and maternal
postal code is high and similar to our main results. This
provides independent confirmatory evidence. Also,
Table 2 shows that the uniform distribution of births
across the days of the year results in very similar
uniqueness values. The uniform distribution increases
uniqueness by 3%-4% only.
Therefore, if we randomly distribute Ontarians with a
known age to a particular day of birth, the impact on
uniqueness is small. Following the uniform distribution
strategy would give us a reasonably accurate measure of
uniqueness for different postal codes.
Next, we obtained the latest information on the popu-
lation sizes by age and gender from the Ontario Minis-
try of Finance based on the 2006 Canadian census. We
also obtained the population sizes for each postal code
in Ontario. For individuals living in each postal code we
randomly assigned them a day of birth. Therefore, we
ended up with a full date of birth and gender for each
individual living in each postal code. Using those three
values, we computed uniqueness on the basic demo-
graphics for each postal code. The random assignment
was repeated 1000 times and the mean uniqueness
taken to represent the uniqueness result for that postal
code.
We then divided the postal codes into those that were
rural and urban.
The median uniqueness for urban postal codes was
100% on the full date of birth and postal code only. For
rural areas it was 98.1%. On the month and year of
birth and postal code, 98.7% of urban Ontarians were
unique, whereas only 57% of rural Ontarians were
unique. Finally, only 1% of rural Ontarians are unique,
whereas 85% of urban Ontarians are unique on year of
birth and postal codes.
These results make clear that the high uniqueness
values for urban populations will not necessarily hold
for rural populations. Ontario rural postal codes tend to
be larger than urban ones (median population size 1086
vs. 25), hence explaining why uniqueness drops off quite
rapidly as the date of birth is generalized.
If one were to apply the policy alternatives under the
5% and 20% thresholds that we present in additional file
2 for rural areas, the policies will still be correct. Albeit,
they will be conservative policies for rural areas.
4.4.3 Comparison to US Results
Previous studies conducted in the US showed that the
percentage of uniques on basic demographics (i.e., date
of birth, ZIP code, and gender) range from 63% to 87%
[39,41], the values are somewhat lower than our find-
ings. This can be explained by the fact that US ZIP
Table 1 A comparison of postal code population sizes among Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto.
Ottawa Montreal Toronto
No. Letters in Postal Code Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 362,211 362,211 1,870,336 1,870,336 699,936 699,936
2 181,106 181,106 267,191 273,240 116,656 88,401
3 16,464 16,368 19,792 19,602 12,498 10,892
4 3,853 4,016 5,616 4,954 3,910 2,286
5 289 220 351 264 324 228
6 40 23 48 30 51 23
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:46
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/46
Page 9 of 12
codes tend to be larger than Canadian postal codes. For
example, the median population for 5-digit ZIP codes is
2,696 (the mean is 8,846), whereas in Canada the med-
ian population size for a postal code is 19 and the mean
is 41. Therefore, one would expect lower uniqueness
values for geographic areas with larger populations.
4.5 Relationship to Previous Work
It has been demonstrated that the trail of locations of
hospitals that a patient has visited can be used to re-
identify their records because such visit trails tend be
unique or sufficiently rare [57,58]. However, hospital
visit data is not part of basic demographics, whereas
individual residence locations are. There is also evidence
that uniqueness can be high when home and work loca-
tions of individuals are known [59], and that home
address (and hence identity) can be determined by
tracking the locations that individuals pass through or
stop at while driving [60].
There have been no studies examining re-identifica-
tion risk from residence trails, and their combination
with basic demographic information.
4.6 Expansion to Other Quasi-identifiers
Our analysis was based on only three quasi-identifiers.
These are common in many data sets used and dis-
closed for health research purposes. Additional quasi-
identifiers, such as socio-economic variables, are also
often used. The addition of these quasi-identifiers would
raise uniqueness. This means that if uniqueness is high
with our three quasi-identifiers then it will also be high
with the addition of other socio-economic quasi-identi-
fiers, and if it was low in our study then it may increase
and exceed the thresholds if more quasi-identifiers are
added.
For longitudinal data sets, some additional quasi-iden-
tifiers will not be affected by time, such as race and eth-
nicity. Others, such as income and language spoken at
home, may vary over time. Therefore, future work
which expands on our core data set should consider
time variability of variables.
4.7 Future Work
Extensions of this work should address the data quality
questions that we have raised. In particular, examination
of causes of missing or inconsistent data would be
needed to determine the impact on uniqueness. It is
also expected that over time data quality will improve
because of better data validation at the point of collec-
tion and better cross-validation with other data sources.
This suggests that a repetition of this analysis in the
Table 2 The difference in between real uniqueness and
uniqueness estimated making the uniform distribution
assumption
% Uniques
Fiscal Yr Total of Births Uniform Dist. Real
2004 113,220 97.8% 93.9%
2005 120,803 97.5% 94.0%
2006 125,724 97.6% 94.0%
2007 136,980 98.0% 94.5%
2008 139,278 98.2% 94.7%
Figure 4 Distribution of population sizes in postal codes for all ten provinces categorized by urban vs. rural.
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future would provide more accurate estimates of
uniqueness.
One advantage that we had was access to a population
registry with long term data that we could sample from.
The replication of this study in other jurisdictions with-
out a population registry may limit the generalizability
of these replications.
In other jurisdictions the cropping of codes represent-
ing areal units may not be appropriate. In our context a
cropped postal code will represent an area that is a
superset of the uncropped area. However, this same
relationship may not hold everywhere.
4.8 Limitations
The postal code data we have represent where indivi-
duals were living at the beginning of the year. This does
not capture any movements within a year that may
occur. The impact of this effect is that our results are
conservative, and may underestimate overall uniqueness.
Although it is not expected that many people would be
making multiple moves within a single year.
5 Conclusions
It is important to maintain the Canadian public’s trust
about the confidentiality of their health information
when used for health research purposes. One way to
achieve this is to de-identify the information used for
research. However, there has been a dearth of studies
examining what information makes Canadians identifi-
able. In this study we examine the re-identification risk
from longitudinal basic demographics: age, gender, and
postal codes over an 11 year period. We found that
indeed the basic demographics can make Canadians
easily re-identifiable. This risk increases as individuals’
residence trails increase in duration. In this paper we
provide detailed data disclosure policy options for infor-
mation custodians under alternative risk thresholds.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Interactive results graphs. This file contains
interactive graphs showing the results for all years from 2 to 11, and also
separately for adults and youth.
Additional file 2: Disclosure policies. This file presents all of the
acceptable disclosures of demographics under the 5% and 20%
uniqueness thresholds.
Author details
1Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Institute, 401 Smyth Road,
Ottawa, Ontario K1J 8L1, Canada. 2Pediatrics, Faculty of Medicine, University
of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 3Department of Epidemiology,
Biostatistics and Occupational Health, McGill University, 1140 Pine Avenue
West, Montreal, Quebec H3A 1A3, Canada.
Authors’ contributions
KEE designed the study, directed the data analysis, performed data analysis,
and contributed to writing the paper. DB designed the study, directed the
data analysis, and contributed to writing the paper. RT designed the study,
directed the data analysis, and contributed to writing the paper. AN
performed data analysis. EJ contributed to writing the paper. AV prepared
the data set for analysis. All of the authors have read and approved the final
manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 16 August 2010 Accepted: 22 June 2011
Published: 22 June 2011
References
1. Arzberger P, Schroeder P, Bealieu A, Bowker G, casey K, Laaksonen L,
Moorman D, Uhlir P, Wouters P: Promoting access to public research data
for scientific, economic, and social development. Data Science Journal
2004, 3(29):135-152.
2. Smith GD: Increasing the accessibility of data. BMJ 1994, 308:1519-1520.
3. Wager L, Krieza-Jeric K: Report Of Public Reporting Of Clinical Trial
Outcomes And Results (PROCTOR) Meeting. Canadian Institutes of Health
Research; 2008.
4. Delamothe T: Let the sunshine in. BMJ 2010, 340:790.
5. Hryanszkiewicz I, Norton M, Vickers A, Altman D: Preparing raw clinical
data for publications: Guidance for journal editors, authors, and peer
reviewers. BMJ 2010, 340:c181.
6. Fienberg S, Martin M, Straf M: Sharing Research Data. Committee on
National Statistics, National Research Council; 1985.
7. Hutchon D: Publishing raw data and real time statistical analysis on e-
journals. BMJ 2001, 322(3):530.
8. Are journals doing enough to prevent fraudulent publication?. CMAJ
2006, 174(4):431.
9. Abraham K: Microdata access and labor market research: The US
experience. Allegmeines Statistisches Archiv 2005, 89:121-139.
10. Vickers A: Whose data set is it anyway ? Sharing raw data from
randomized trials. Trials 2006, 7(15).
11. Altman D, Cates C: Authors should make their data available. BMJ 2001,
323:1069.
12. Delamothe T: Whose data are they anyway ? BMJ 1996, 312:1241-1242.
13. Commission of the European Communities: On Scientific Information In
The Digital Age: Access, Dissemination And Preservation. 2007.
14. Lowrance W: Access To Collections Of Data And Materials For Health
Research: A Report To The Medical Research Council And The Wellcome
Trust. Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust; 2006.
15. Yolles B, Connors J, Grufferman S: Obtaining access to data from
government-sponsored medical research. NEJM 1986, 315(26):1669-1672.
16. Hogue C: Ethical issues in sharing epidemiologic data. Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology 1991, 44(Suppl. I):103S-107S.
17. Hedrick T: Justifications for the sharing of social science data. Law and
Human Behavior 1988, 12(2):163-171.
18. Mackie C, Bradburn N: Improving Access To And Confidentiality Of
Research Data: Report Of A Workshop. Washington: The National
Academies Press; 2000.
19. Boyko E: Why disseminate microdata? United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Workshop on Census and
Survey Microdata. 2008.
20. Cavoukian A: Privacy concerns in preventing fraudulent publication.
CMAJ 2006, 175(1):61-62.
21. Nass S, Levit L, Gostin L, eds: Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing
privacy, improving health through research. National Academies Press:
Washington, DC; 2009.
22. Damschroder L, Pritts J, Neblo M, Kalarickal R, Creswell J, Hayward R:
Patients, privacy and trust: Patients’ willingness to allow researchers to
access their medical records. Social Science & Medicine 2007, 64:223-235.
23. Mayer TS: Privacy and Confidentiality Research and the US Census
Bureau: Recommendations based on a review of the literature. US
Bureau of the Census: Washington, DC; 2002.
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:46
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/46
Page 11 of 12
24. Singer E, van Hoewyk J, Neugebauer RJ: Attitudes and Behaviour: The
impact of privacy and confidentiality concerns on participation in the
2000 census. Public Opinion Quarterly 2003, 67:368-384.
25. Council National Research : Privacy and Confidentiality as Factors in
Survey Response. Washington: National Academy of Sciences; 1979.
26. Martin E: Privacy Concerns and the Census Long Form: Some Evidence
From Census 2000. Annual Meeting of the American Statistical Association
Washington, DC; 2001.
27. Kosseim P, Brady M: Policy by procrastination: Secondary use of
electronic health records for health research purposes. McGill Journal of
Law and Health; 2008, 2.
28. Lowrance W: Learning from experience: Privacy and the secondary use
of data in health research. Journal of Health Services Research and Policy
2003, 8(S1):2-7.
29. Pullman D: Sorry, you can’t have that information: Stakeholder
awareness, perceptions and concerns regarding the disclosure and use
of personal health information. e-Health 2006. 2006.
30. OIPC Stakeholder Survey, 2003: Highlights Report. GPC Research; 2003.
31. Willison D, Schwartz L, Abelson J, Charles C, Swinton M, Northrup D,
Thabane L: Alternatives to project-specific consent for access to personal
information for health research: What is the opinion of the Canadian
public ? Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 2007,
14:706-712.
32. Nair K, Willison D, Holbrook A, Keshavjee K: Patients’ consent preferences
regarding the use of their health information for research purposes: A
qualitative study. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy 2004,
9(1):22-27.
33. Kass N, Natowicz M, Hull S, et al: The use of medical records in research:
What do patients want? Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003,
31:429-33.
34. Whiddett R, Hunter I, Engelbrecht J, Handy J: Patients’ attitudes towards
sharing their health information. International Journal of Medical
Informatics 2006, 75:530-41.
35. Pritts J: The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health
Information: Roles of HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common Rule in
Health Research. Institute of Medicine 2008, http://www.iom.edu/~/media/
Files/Activity%20Files/Research/HIPAAandResearch/
PrittsPrivacyFinalDraftweb.pdf Archived at: http://www.webcitation.org/
5zIKpVDHk.
36. Willison D, Emerson C, Szala-Meneok K, Gibson E, Schwartz L, Weisbaum K:
Access to medical records for research purposes: Varying perceptions
across Research Ethics Boards. Journal of Medical Ethics 2008, 34:308-314.
37. Panel on Research Ethics: Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct
for Research Involving Humans., 2 2009, Draft.
38. Bethlehem J, Keller W, Pannekoek J: Disclosure control of microdata.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 1990, 85(409):38-45.
39. Sweeney L: Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US Population.
Carnegie Mellon University, Laboratory for International Data Privacy; 2000.
40. El Emam K, Brown A, Abdelmalik P: Evaluating Predictors of Geographic
Area Population Size Cutoffs to Manage Re-identification Risk. Journal of
the American Medical Informatics Association 2009, 16(2):256-266, [PMID:
19074299].
41. Golle P: Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US
population. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2006.
42. El Emam K, Brown A, AbdelMalik P, Neisa A, Walker M, Bottomley J,
Roffey T: A method for managing re-identification risk from small
geographic areas in Canada. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making
2010, 10(18).
43. Koot M, Noordende G, de Laat C: A study on the re-identifiability of
Dutch citizens. Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET
2010). 2010.
44. Benitez K, Malin B: Evaluating re-identification risks with respect to the
HIPAA privacy rule. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
2010, 17(2):169-177.
45. Kosseim P, Kardash A, Penta A: Compendium of Canadian Legislation
Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in Health Research.
Canadian Institutes of Health Research; 2005.
46. Clause S, Triller D, Bornhorst C, Hamilton R, Cosler L: Conforming to HIPAA
regulations and compilation of research data. American Journal of Health-
System Pharmacy 2004, 61(10):1025-1031.
47. Zayatz L: Estimation of the percent of unique population elements on a
microdata file using the sample. US Bureau of the Census: Washington;
1991.
48. National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics: Report to the Secretary
of the US Department of Health and Human Services on Enhanced
Protections for Uses of Health Data: A Stewardship Framework for
“Secondary Uses” of Electronically Collected and Transmitted Health
Data. 2007.
49. Sweeney L: Data sharing under HIPAA: 12 years later. Workshop on the
HIPAA Privacy Rule’s De-Identification Standard. 2010 [http://www.
hhshipaaprivacy.com/].
50. Lafky D: The Safe Harbor method of de-identification: An empirical test.
Fourth National HIPAA Summit West 2010 [http://www.ehcca.com/
presentations/HIPAAWest4/lafky_2.pdf ], http://www.webcitation.org/
5xA2HIOmj.
51. Howe H, Lake A, Shen T: Method to assess identifiability in electronic
data files. American Journal of Epidemiology 2007, 165(5):597-601.
52. Howe H, Lake A, Lehnherr M, Roney D: Unique Record Identification On
Public Use Files As Tested On The 1994-1998 CINA Analytic File. North
American Association of Central Cancer Registries 2002.
53. El Emam K: Heuristics for de-identifying health data. IEEE Security and
Privacy 2008, 72-75.
54. Skinner G, Elliot M: A measure of disclosure risk for microdata. Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society (Series B) 2002, 64(Part 4):855-867.
55. El Emam K, Dankar F: Protecting privacy using k-anonymity. Journal of the
American Medical Informatics Association 2008, 15:627-637.
56. Pong R, Pitblado J: Don’t take geography for granted ! Some
methodological issues in measuring geographic distribution of
physicians. Canadian Journal of Rural Medicine 2001, 6(2):103-112.
57. Malin B, Sweeney L, Newton E: Trail re-identification: Learning who you
are from where you have been. Carnegie Mellon University; 2003.
58. Malin B, Sweeney L: Re-identification of DNA through an automated
linkage process. Proceedings of the American Medical Informatics Association
Annual Symposium 2001.
59. Golle P, Partridge K: On the anonymity of home/work location pairs.
Seventh International Conference on Pervasive Computing 2009.
60. Krumm J: Inference attacks on location tracks. Fifth International
Conference on Pervasive Computing 2007.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/46/prepub
doi:10.1186/1472-6947-11-46
Cite this article as: El Emam et al.: The re-identification risk of Canadians
from longitudinal demographics. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision
Making 2011 11:46.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
El Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:46
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/46
Page 12 of 12
